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1. Initial Situation
Until the peaceful revolution of late 1989 and the changes in the
political and economic system enacted thereafter, the population
of the GDR had lived in a typical Soviet-type economy '.
Political and economic decision-making was centralized at the
top, the major means of production including all firms in
industry were owned by the state, a rigid plan guided the
allocation of inputs and the distribution of outputs, investible
funds were collected by the one-tier system of state banks and -
under the control of the planning authorities - channelled to the
firms according to rather arbitrary priorities. Furthermore, the
fixed prices did not convey any reliable and relevant information
about true economic scarcities. To firms, these prices were
little else than mere bookkeeping entries.
Industries were organized as state monopolies, with almost all of
the roughly 3400 industrial firms being grouped together into 231
vertically and horizontally integrated combines ("Kombinate"), of
which 126 were directly controlled by the respective central
2) branch ministries and the remaining 95 by regional authorities '.
Between the combines, the markets were clearly segmented; any
disputes on the delineation of the markets for specific
industries had to be settled by government decision. For
instance, a GDR publisher of children's books was not allowed to
print an economics text. If he had wanted to publish an economics
text for children, a government decision would have been
necessary.
1) The term has been coined by Winiecki (1988).
2) Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR (1989), p. 138.Externally, foreign trade was conducted by a government monopoly.
The exchange of goods with other socialist countries mostly took
the form of outright bilateral barter; firms exporting to the
West were not confronted with a uniform exchange rate but with a
system of product and firm specific rates ("Richtungsko-
ef fizienten" ) supposed to equate the production costs in local
currency to the world market price. Because of both the state
monopoly on foreign trade and these differential exchange rates,
there was no direct link between the GDR's comparative advantage
and its export structure.
In the absence of competition and private ownership, managers of
firms were not driven by self interest to make profits in an
economically meaningful sense; they merely strove to fulfill (or
to successfully pretend to fulfill) the prescribed targets. As
the firms could not go bankrupt, they had little endogenous
incentive to improve their efficiency. Instead, they faced what
Janos Kornai has christened the "soft budget constraint" (1980).
If the financial situation became precarious, the state-owned
firms could rely on the state banks to supply them with the
needed funds to pay their bills; if the price competitiveness of
exporters to the West was endangered, they had the easy option of
asking for a simple adjustment of the "Richtungskoeffizient"
instead of keeping costs in check or of restructuring their
output mix. The better the managers of a firm were at influencing
political decision making, the easier the life they and the
workers in their factory could lead.
Except for some minor allowances for tourists, the GDR currency
was completely inconvertible into foreign money, at least
officially. In fact, even the "internal convertibility", i.e. the
opportunity to exchange the money for goods at home, was rather
limited. Many important goods, including essential inputs for
industrial firms, were not available in sufficient quantities
through the official channels. In any case, deliveries could
hardly be stepped up if - due to unforeseen circumstances - a
producer needed more than the pre-planned quantity of a specific
input to meet his own production plan. Hence, firms frequentlyhad to resort to barter trade or to payments in hard currency DM
to get hold of these inputs.
As a consequence, the GDR industry exhibited four major
weaknesses:
(1) Firms tended to keep huge inventories of raw materials and
intermediate goods as buffers against unexpected and unplanned
developments. In a similar vein, industrial efficiency was
severely impaired by a tendency towards self-production of
inputs, with firms forfeiting both the benefits from an inter-
firm division of labour according to their specific comparative
advantages and from economies of scale. Moreover, each of the
combines attempted to be almost autarchic with regard to those
services that are normally contracted out in the West. The
combines - and in many cases even the firms within the combines -
usually had their own departments for the construction of firm
buildings and the self-production of capital goods, for
maintenance work and repairs, for transport and even for child
care. The inherent bias against a rational division of labour
between firms was even fostered by deliberate policy: The
combines in the investment goods industries were required to
produce consumer goods worth at least 5 per cent of their total
output. For example, a Dresden firm specialising on x-ray
equipment and transformers had to devote some of its skills and
resources to the production of raclette sets for GDR consumers.
(2) The tendency towards underspecialisation showed up in foreign
trade as well. Under market conditions, the GDR with a population
of merely 16.7 million should have had a signicantly higher share
of imports and exports in GNP than the much larger West Germany
(62 million people). Nevertheless, the export quota of the GDR
(roughly 25 per cent) was far below the West German one (35 per
cent) and less than half the Dutch one (54 per cent), although
the Netherlands are - in terms of population - a country of
almost comparable size.' According to one calculation, the metal processing industry of
the GDR covered 65 per cent of the range of goods that exist in
this category in the world, its much more specialized counterpart
4) in the much larger Federal Republic only 17 per cent
 ; . Once
again, the bias against a rational division of labour was in part
the consequence of a deliberate policy aimed at a high degree of
self-sufficiency in most products. Furthermore, the major part of
exports (between 46 and 70 per cent, depending on the exchange
rates chosen to compare deliveries to socialist countries to
those to the world market) went to the European members of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and were hence not
subject to noticeable competition from other suppliers. To make
matters worse, the structure of specialization within the CMEA
was determined by a political bargaining process, not by a
market-based assessment of economic viability.
(3) As the behaviour of firms was neither controlled by private
owners nor by a capital market, managers had no pronounced
incentive to keep the physical capital stock intact. In a market
economy, a systematic neglect of the physical assets would show
up in a declining stock market value of the firm; under the
conditions of central planning, state ownership of the means of
production and a soft budget constraint, neither managers nor
workers have a well defined interest in safeguarding and
augmenting the future productive potential of the firm. For
similar reasons, new technologies were introduced only slowly and
reluctantly in the GDR industry.
(4) The centralization of the major investment decisions at the
top resulted in a significant bias towards a few large scale
projects. To reduce the dependency on oil imports from the USSR
after the oil shocks of 1973/74 and 1979/80, the GDR had embarked
upon an economically wasteful and ecologically desastrous
3) Siebert (1990a), pp. 5, 16; Siebert (1990c).
4) Institut fur angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (1990a), p. 33.5
programme of extracting and burning domestic lignite for the
generation of electricity and for heating '; to overcome the
GDR's technological backwardness, resources were channeled on a
grand scale into microelectronics without proper consideration of
opportunity costs.
As a consequence of these shortcomings, the existing capital
stock of the GDR industry is mostly technologically outdated, to
a considerable extent physically run down and largely
economically and ecologically obsolete. Only 27 per cent of the
equipment in industry is not older than five years, 50.6 per cent
is older than 10 years and 21.1 per cent older than 20 years. In
comparison, 39.3 per cent of all industrial equipment in West
Germany has been installed in the last five years, 69.7 per cent
in the last 10 years. '
Unsurprisingly, labour productivity in the GDR industry is far
below the West German level. According to a frequently cited
calculation by the Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
(DIW) which is based on 1983 data, East German workers are
7) roughly half as productive as West German ones (52 per cent). '
Meanwhile DIW estimates that the gap is somewhat larger than 50
8) per cent. ' However, while the physical productivity is
comparatively easy to measure, the estimates cited above are
marred by the difficulty of guessing the appropriate world market
prices for GDR goods. These prices are needed to compare the
value productivity in both parts of Germany. Guesstimates
5) For example, the emission of sulphur dioxides per square
kilometre in the GDR is almost four times as high as in West
Germany (Institut fur angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (1990a), p.
56) although the population density in the GDR is almost 40 per
cent below the West German level.
6) Institut fur Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft (1990),
Table 7.
7) Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (1987), p. 390.
8) Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (1990a), p. 9.employing the actual export prices for GDR goods to calculate the
true value of the GDR industrial output indicate that the value
productivity reaches at best one third of the West German
9) level. ' The virtual disappearance of many GDR goods from the
shelves of East German shops after the introduction of the German
Economic, Monetary and Social Union (GEMU) on July 1, 1990
corroborates the hypothesis that GDR retailers and consumers -
given a choice - do not attach much value to these goods.
2. The Dimensions of the Task
Because of both the traditional emphasis which planners in
socialist countries put on the secondary sector and the wasteful
underspecialization of Soviet-type economies, the manufacturing
sector in the GDR is in general somewhat overblown. 40.9 per cent
of the East German labour force is employed in manufacturing as
opposed to 33.6 per cent in West Germany. ' Furthermore, GDR
employment is heavily concentrated in sunset sectors and branches
that have been declining rapidly in the West in the last decades.
Taken together, agriculture, forestry and fishery, energy and
mining, and the clothing, leather goods and textiles branches of
manufacturing account for 17.3 per cent of the GDR labour force
as opposed to merely 8.8 per cent in West Germany. '
A comparison between the present employment structure in the GDR
and in the Federal Republic may serve as a very rough estimate of
the structural change which the GDR economy will have to undergo
to catch up with the West. In order to attain the same pattern of
employment which prevailed in 1989 in West Germany, East German
employment in agriculture, forestry and fishery would have to go
down by 56.3 per cent, in energy and mining by 50 per cent, in
9) See for instance Schmieding (1990a).
10) Including crafts; Siebert (1990a), p. 15.
11) Calculations by the Kiel Institute of World Economics.12 ^ transport by 2 6.9 per cent and in manufacturing ' by 24.1 per
cent. On the other hand, employment in commerce (retail and
wholesale trade) would increase by 61.9 per cent. All in all, the
net loss of 1.2 million jobs would come about as the result of
the declining sectors shedding 2.8 million employees while the
labour force in the expanding sectors would increase by
1.6 million. In other words, even in the process of an otherwise
smooth and successful transition to the West German pattern of
employment, 28.9 per cent of the GDR workforce would have to (or
want to) leave their present jobs in the branches that are bound
to decline. Sure enough, this number is but a very rough
guesstimate of the long-run changes in employment which the
restructuring of the GDR economy will entail. On the one hand,
the differences between the East and the West German pattern of
employment may to some extent reflect genuine differences in the
comparative advantages of the two locations and will thus not
need to be corrected; on the other hand, however, the
obsolescence of a large part of the present GDR capital stock and
the uncompetitiveness of many GDR goods imply that there has be a
reshuffling of labour even within the various branches of
manufacturing from uncompetitive to competitive firms on a grand
scale. Hence, it is likely that even more than one third of the
workforce in GDR manufacturing will have to leave its present job
over the course of the adjustment process.
Unfortunately, the pronounced concentration of the GDR industry
is likely to considerably impair the adjustment flexibility. The
observation that the GDR industry is heavily concentrated holds
true even if not the combines but their constituent firms are
analyzed. In the GDR, only 4.4 per cent of all industrial workers
are employed in small firms with less than 100 employees (West
Germany: 17.6), 10.6 per cent in medium-sized firms with 100 to
499 employees (29.4) and 11.8 per cent in large firms with 500 to
12) The numbers include the effect of a decline of the GDR
participation rate to the lower West German level; calculations
by the Kiel Institute of World Economics.8
1000 employees (13.2). The bulk of industrial employment (73.2
per cent) is in very large and hence typically rather inflexible
firms with more than 1000 employees (West Germany: 39.8).
 ;
With the introduction of the GEMU, the GDR producers have lost
their well protected and clearly segmented outlets. Instead, they
have to compete directly with Western suppliers. By necessity,
the imminent restructuring of the GDR industry will have a
variety of dimensions. It will
be part of a general structural change away from the
secondary (and primary sector) towards modern services, with
many of the business-related and the social services that
are presently being inefficiently rendered within firms
being contracted out in the future;
imply a pronounced shift of resources within manufacturing
from sunset to sunrise branches;
have to go along with a change in the product mix of firms
and with considerable improvements in the quality of
products;
give rise to a higher degree of inter-firm and international
specialization to reap the benefits of economies of scale
and of an extended division of labour;
compel firms to make more efficient use of resources, in
particular of natural resources and energy, and to
drastically reduce the emission of pollutants;
neccessitate a considerable reduction in the average size of
the firms to make the economy more flexible;
entail both the reorganization and privatization of existing
firms and, given the dismal state of many firms at present,
the large scale establishment of new producers; and
13) Institut fur angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (1990b), p. 8.
Taking West Germany's business sector as a whole, the importance
of small and medium sized firms becomes even more obvious. 79 per
cent of all jobs in the business sector (i.e. the entire economy
excluding the state, private households and non-profit
organizations) are in firms with less than 500 employees; Schmidt
(1990), p. 12.9
go along with a sizeable inflow of capital from abroad.
While the GEMU has exposed GDR producers to external competition
and hence made the need for a thorough shake up of the existing
structure of production obvious, it has at the same time created
favourable macro- and microeconomic conditions for a successful
process of catching up of the GDR vis-a-vis the West. Most prices
can move freely to reflect relative scarcities, the system of
central planning has been abolished, the state monopoly of
foreign trade is gone (although the issue of the existing
obligations vis-a-vis the other CMEA countries, most notably the
USSR, has not yet been resolved), inputs are readily available
and the almost useless GDR currency has been replaced by the
trustworthy and fully convertible DM. Moreover, a modern West-
German-style banking system is being established rapidly. In
short, the most important devices are already there which, in a
market economy based on private ownership of the major means of
production, serve to direct resources into their most productive
uses and to equate the domestic costs of production with the
international opportunity costs of the resources employed. The
major task of the coming years is to disassemble the almost
completely state-owned and monopolized GDR supply side into
privately owned and commercially viable units which are compelled
by the self-interest of their owners, managers and workers to
heed the market signals and to safeguard and augment the value of
the firm's assets.
Broadly speaking, the restructuring of the GDR industry can be
divided into three logically distinct issues and processes,
namely (i) the reorganization and privatization of existing
firms, (ii) the establishment of new firms and (iii) the
structural changes that will occur during the adjustment crisis
and the subsequent process of catching up. As the existing
industrial firms are owned by the state, the first issue
neccessitates active state interventions. Once the state has
created the respective favourable conditions, the two other
issues could and should be left to private initiative and hence
the market.10
3. Outline of a Rational Privatization Programme
With regard to the restructuring and privatization of existing
firms, the task can be divided into three aspects, namely the
definition of viable units, the transformation of these units
into joint stock or limited liability companies initially still
owned by the state and ultimately the sale of these firms to
private bidders. By now, i.e. by the end of July 1990, the first
two processes are already under way, although progress is rather
slow in some cases. Most of the combines have either been
dissolved into their constituent firms or at least been
transformed into mere holding companies with limited practical
say in the affairs of the firms; in some instances, the
maintenance, transport and construction departments of industrial
firms have already turned into independent spin-off units. This
process is likely to go on, it can and should be linked to the
privatization itself (see below). Furthermore, in compliance with
the deadline set for the end of June 1990, the legal switch from
people's ownership ("Volkseigentum") to joint stock or limited
liability companies owned by a state agency has already taken
place, at least on paper; although most of the roughly 8000 firms
emerging in this way have still not completed the required
14) formalities.
 ;
Before we analyze the privatization programme that is to be
implemented in the GDR it is useful to establish a reference
system. A rational privatization scheme ought to meet a variety
of economic and political criteria. It should
lay the basis for an efficient allocation of capital,
be rapidly and easily implementable;
provide an incentive for an effective management of the
firms in the meantime,
14) They ought to do so by the end of October 1990 at latest;
presently, they are named joint stock or limited liability
companies "im Aufbau" (in the process of being established);
Treuhandge s et z §20.11
broaden political support for the privatization programme,
and
enable citizens with little savings of their own to acquire
shares if they wanted to do so.
A programme which has been proposed in a slightly different form
for Poland in late 1989 by Kostrzewa (1989) and adapted to the
situation in the GDR at that time by Kostrzewa and Schmieding
(1990) meets these requirements. ' It has the following main
elements: (1) When the state-owned firms are transformed into
joint stock or limited liability companies, they are given
property titles to the land on which they are built. (2)
Initially, all these firms are put into the hands of a number of,
say ten, independent and competing privatization agencies.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to know in advance wich
firms will ultimately be profitable and which will incur
permanent losses. Although this uncertainty might be reduced by
extensively screening all firms beforehand, this would take a
considerable amount of a very scarce resource, namely time.
Hence, the firms should be allocated to the various privatization
agencies (or holdings) by a simple lottery. Firms that will turn
out to be profitable eventually and those that will not are thus
likely to be distributed roughly evenly between the various
agencies. An allocation of firms to the agencies on a sectoral
basis only would revive the old planning structure and networks.
(3) The agencies are compelled by law to sell all the firms that
are in their portfolio within a fixed period of time, say five
years, and to dissolve themselves afterwards. (4) The agencies
are themselves incorporated as joint stock companies. A sizeable
part of the shares in every agency, say 60 per cent, is
distributed to the domestic population for free, the rest may
remain with the state. Initially, every adult citizen would thus
own an equal amount of shares in all ten privatization agencies.
15) Similar proposals have been advanced by various authors,
including Blanchard and Layard in a recent article in the
Financial Times (July 11, 1990).12
However, the privately owned shares can be traded freely on the
stock market. (5) Every six months, the revenues which every
agency has already collected by the sale of some of its firms are
distributed to the agency's shareholders (privatization
dividend) . The market value of the shares in the agencies would
hence reflect the efficiency with which they run and sell their
respective bits of the GDR industry. Incidentally, the agencies'
managers should be paid according to the stock market value of
their agency to give them a direct personal interest in doing a
good job.
The scheme has various advantages. As the agencies are to be run
as independent and competing institutions whose performance is
permanently evaluated by the stock market, they will strive to
maximize the value of their portfolio, i.e. the privatization
proceeds. Hence, they have a strong incentive to establish
efficient management of these firms immediately and to waste no
money on keeping clearly uhviable firms in business. For the same
reason, these agencies could be entrusted with the task of
identifying the optimal size of the subunits to be offered for
sale. At the same time, they could decide whether it is more
profitable to streamline and restructure the firms" before they
are privatized or to sell the ownership titles in these firms
immediately at a heavy discount and to leave the painful
reorganization - which is bound to entail large scale lay-offs in
most cases - to the new private owners. Because of the free
distribution of shares in the agencies to the population, every
adult citizen would indirectly own a part of every enterprise, of
the promising and the ultimately untenable ones. If shares of
individual enterprises were given instead to selected segments of
the population, say the employees of a firm, the recipients of
the shares of firms that will go bankrupt would - without any
fault of their own - end up with a worthless portfolio. As a
major part of the privatization proceeds are to be handed out
directly to the population, the citizens - at least those which
have not yet sold all their shares in the holdings - will have a
direct stake in a swift and efficient privatization in general
and in the participation of badly needed foreign capital in thisBibJiothek des Institute
fur WcStwirtschaft Kiel
13
process in particular. The presence of foreign bidders will raise
the price for which the firms could be sold off and hence
increase the privatisation revenue. Furthermore, the bi-annual
distribution of these proceeds implies that even citizens without
major savings of their own would have the means to become
shareholders in the new private enterprises. The frequently cited
lack of domestic capital would cease to be an obstacle to a
rapid, successful and politically feasible privatization.
Naturally, the revenues accruing to the state could serve to keep
the budget deficit in check, to augment the infrastructure, to
repair ecological damages and to reduce business taxes.
4. The Present GDR Approach
The details of the way in which the GDR industry is to be
privatized have not yet been determined. Major decisions have
already been taken, though. In early March 1990, the interim
government of Hans Modrow established the "Treuhandanstalt"
(trust agency) as a mega-holding for the state owned firms
("Volkseigene Betriebe", VEBs) of all sectors of the economy. In
accordance with the broad guidelines of the GEMU treaty between
East and West Germany, the Treuhandanstalt has been revamped by
the democratically elected new GDR parliament in mid-June 1990.
The clear task of the new Treuhand is to privatize the VEBs as
rapidly as possible, in combination with a deconcentration.
Furthermore, the Treuhand should promote the structural
adjustment process. The agency will be headed by two senior top
managers from West Germany; it will act under the supervision of
the GDR prime minister. As far as the internal organization is
concerned, the Treuhand will be a mere holding company for a
variety of sub-agencies which are to be incorporated as joint
stock companies. These "Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaften" owned
exclusively by the Treuhand will carry out the actual operations.
Although this scheme does have some similarities with the concept
presented above, in has a few noticeable drawbacks:14
1. No time frame has been set within which the Treuhand must have
completed its task. Hence, it can not be excluded that the
self-interest of the employees in a permanent job will turn the
agency into a self-perpetuating and expanding institution,
reluctant to make itself obsolete by privatizing all firms.
Instead, it may try to become a permanent body for the assistance
of ailing industries.
2. The individual firms will be allocated to the various sub-
agencies (Treuhand-AGs) by the end of August 1990 according to
"considerations of expediency" ', i.e. along sectoral lines.
While this organizational set up has the advantage that it makes
a pooling of sector-specific expertise possible, it is
uncomfortably reminiscent of the old socialist branch ministries.
The major hazard is that these sub-agencies may be rather prone
to rent-seeking by sectoral lobbies. Fortunately, the number of
Treuhand-AGs will probably be limited to six; three in industry
for the producer goods, the investment goods and the consumer
goods branches respectively plus one each for agriculture,
17) commerce (wholesale and retail trade) and for other services. '
This may help to prevent that the various Treuhand-AGs identify
themselves too closely with individual branches.
3. As the shares in the Treuhand-AGs are not transferable, the
performance of these agencies will not be constantly evaluated by
the capital market.
4. The eventual privatization proceeds are to be used primarily
for the structural adjustment of the state owned firms and,
secondly, for the consolidation of the state budget. As none of
the revenue will be distributed directly to the population, the
citizens will not enjoy any direct personal gain.
16) §7(3) Treuhandgesetz.
17) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, (19.09.1990), p. 1115
5. The most important flaw is that the Treuhand has to deal with
two tasks, namely (i) the privatization of firms and (ii) the
promotion of the structural adjustment process. This combination
may not neccessarily be harmful if the tasks were to be carried
out by an independent agency run like a private company and hence
compelled to be exclusively efficiency-oriented. However, the set
up envisaged for the GDR implies that a state institution subject
to political pressure will try to single out the potentially
competetive firms and to determine which firms will get what kind
of adjustment assistance. Given the size of the adjustment
problem and the uncertainties involved in the transition to a
market economy, it is highly unlikely that a state agency could
successfully pick the winners and invest its revenues
efficiently. In this respect, the example of developing countries
is quite instructive. While open and export-oriented countries
have fared spectacularly well, others which have relied on an
import-substitution strategy based on external protection and the
subsidization of selected sectors have fallen far behind.
Furthermore, there is a major moral hazard involved in the
present GDR approach. As managers and workers of firms know that
the Treuhand is authorized to spend the privatization proceeds on
subsidies for firms, they may find it much easier to clamour for
additional support out of this potentially large fund than to
adapt to the pressure of competition (or go bankrupt). Hence, it
may well happen that almost the entire privatization proceeds
will merely serve to prolong the life of ultimately unviable
firms (Schmieding 1990b). This would lock in resources which
could be employed more productively elsewhere. The adjustment
process would be considerably delayed and made much more
expensive at the same time.
Two further regulations which the GDR has adopted recently are
likely to considerably hinder the process of privatization and
industrial restructuring: (i) The purchaser of a GDR firm has to
take over all employment contracts (§ 613a of West Germany's
civil law code BGB), even if the firm in question is part of a
larger unit that has gone bankrupt, (ii) The GDR parliament has16
copied West Germany's rather restrictive dismissal rules,
including the obligation to pay compensation to employees in the
case of large-scale redundancies ("Sozialplanpflicht"). As the
restructuring of existing firms is likely to necessitate a
noticeable slimming of the labour force in the vast majority of
cases, prospective investors will probably be quite reluctant to
take over these burdens by buying existing firms. In any case,
the price for which the shares of these firms can eventually be
sold will be reduced by the expected dismissal costs (including a
premium for the legal risks and the unpleasantness involved).
In addition, the first collective bargaining agreements concluded
in the GDR after the GEMU have raised further hurdles for
investors. Besides wage increases in the range of 20-30 per cent
that seem to be way out of line with what is warranted by the
value productivity of labour in the GDR, employers and employees
in the metal-processing industry have agreed upon a one-year ban
18) on dismissals. ' If this is copied by other sectors and if the
Treuhand is compelled by political pressure to prevent
large-scale bankruptcies of firms, the desparately needed
adjustment process in the GDR may - in the worst case - not start
in earnest prior to mid-1991.
These regulations and agreements seem to be based on the
presumption that the costs can be shifted onto somebody else. In
short: the decision makers sometimes seem to behave as if the
entire GDR economy is facing a kind of soft budget constraint,
perhaps in expectation of additional assistance from West
Germany. While West Germany will clearly supply considerable
funds to help the GDR economy and to increase living standards in
East Germany, the present arrangements for the restructuring of
the GDR economy imply the hazard that a large amount of capital
will be wasted on keeping unprofitable firms in business.
Instead, it would make much more sense to improve the
18) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.07.1990, p. 9.17
attractiveness of East Germany as a location of production for
instance by quickly shaping up the transport and
telecommunications infrastructure.
5. What Is to Be Done?
Clearly, the main hazard is that the process of privatization and
restructuring will be delayed and perhaps even be given a wrong
direction by discretionary political interference (Siebert
199Od). Therefore, the two general guidelines to be recommended
are to keep politics and rent-seeking out of the privatization
process and to leave the allocation of investible funds to old
and new firms alike to the capital market. The role of politics
should be restricted to setting appropriate rules for the
Treuhand and to creating favourable conditions for the
restructuring of old and the growth of new businesses. In
practice, this means the following:
(1) The Treuhand should be granted an independent status similar
to that of the German Bundesbank and should be obliged to sell
off all its assets within a fixed period of time.
(2) The privatization proceeds should be distributed in part to
the GDR population, the remainder being handed over to the state.
(3) The statute of the Treuhand should state that the initiative
to privatize a specific firm at a certain point of time might be
taken by any interested party, i.e. by the Treuhand itself or by
any prospective buyer. As soon as any investor, including the
management of the firm, has notified the Treuhand of his interest
in purchasing a majority stake in the firm, the Treuhand
automatically would have to publish the envisaged contract,
invite alternative bids during a period of say three months and
then sell to the highest bidder. This rule would minimize the
danger of insider-deals. At the same time, it would make it
unlikely that profitable firms would remain with the Treuhand for
a long time. Sure enough, the Treuhand would still face the task
of closing down the lastingly uncompetitive firms. In many cases,18
a formal bankruptcy may give firms, or at least part of the
firms, the opportunity for a fresh start unburdened by their
i 9 \
previous debt. '
(4) The same procedure as described above should be made
applicable to any subunit of the legal entities which are
presently defined as firms. Hence, every interested party could
initiate the dismantling of firms into smaller units and thus
contribute to a less concentrated organizational structure of the
GDR industry. Management buy-outs and, in the case of small and
medium sized units, even worker buy-outs are likely to play a
considerable role in this process.
(5) Especially the roughly 12.000 small- and medium-sized firms
which fell into the hands of the state in the last major wave of
nationalizations in 1972 and are now part of larger units should
be returned quickly to their previous owners. This would greatly
contribute to the process of deconcentration of the GDR economy.
In more than 50 per cent of the cases, the former owners had
already filed the respective applications by the end of June
1990.
 ; All in all, only about 100.000 people in the GDR are
self-employed (excluding agriculture); taking the much more
balanced employment structure of West Germany as a norm, one
should expect the number of self-employed to rise roughly
21) sevenfold. ' Hence, there should be considerable scope for the
establishment of small and medium-sized businesses in the GDR.
(6) The state should cushion the adverse social consequences that
will initially arise during a swift adjustment process by direct
personal transfers and by supporting requalification programmes.
If their is to be further adjustment assistance to the firms, it
19) Siebert (1990b).
20) Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 30.06.1990
21) Siebert (1990b).19
should be granted on a non-discriminatory basis, for instance in
the form of a general tax relief for all firms.
(7) According to present plans, GDR firms will have access to
special liquidity credits in the first three months of GEMU to
pay for wages and non-labour inputs. Within certain limits (a
provisional ceiling has been set at 10 bn. DM) these credits will
be guaranteed by the Treuhand. As the requests for these credits
22 ^ amounted to 24 bn. DM by mid-July already, ' the Treuhand will
have the discretion to decide which applications should be
entertained and which not. Given the precarious economic and
political situation in the GDR, it may be perhaps argued that
some kind of special state assistance for firms may be needed to
cushion the immediate impact of the introduction of the GEMU.
Nevertheless, the decisions on the allocation of funds to firms
should not be taken by the Treuhand itself but by banks. For
instance, the Treuhand could initially offer to guarantee a
certain share of each credit which a bank grants to a GDR firm.
Over the course of time, this per centage should be progressively
reduced according to a prefixed schedule. After a certain time,
say six months, this risk-sharing arrangement would be phased out
completely. This scheme has the advantage that all credit
requests would be scrutinized by banks who, putting i.a. their
own money at risk, would directly suffer from any default.
(8) Given the dismal state of many existing firms in the GDR, the
extent to which the necessary structural changes can take place
within and between established firms is limited. New firms will
have to provide a major part of the future jobs in the GDR.
Therefore, the remaining impediments to the establishment of new
firms need to be removed. For instance, the insufficient
provision of land and of shop and office space has turned out to
22) Handelsblatt, 19.07.1990. 24 bn. DM for three months would be
roughly equal to 40 per cent of the East German GNP in this
period. Standard estimates put the annual GNP of the GDR in the
range of 225 to 272 bn. DM per year (Siebert 1990a, p. 9;
Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung 1990b, p. 354).20
be a major obstacle in this respect. Greater efforts by the GDR
authorities may be quite helpful. In the last analysis, however,
the lack of adequate facilities is attributable to the fact that
the GDR does not yet have a proper market in land and office
space. In a similar vein, the housing shortage caused by the
absurdly low rents is a major constraint on the mobility of
workers within the GDR. Hence, a liberalization of these markets,
socially cushioned by rent subsidies for people with low incomes,
should not be delayed any longer. This could make it much easier
for new firms to develop in the GDR and for workers to move from
unfavourable locations to those places were they can find a
better job.21
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